Financial policy and corporate investment in imperfect capital markets : the case of Korea by Dailami, Mansoor
Policy,  Re.earch,  and  Extemal  Affairs
WORKING  PAPERS
Financial  Policy  and  Systems
Country  Economics  Department







The Case of Korea
Mansoor  Dailami
The vigorous expansion  of corporate real investment in Korea in
the 1980s  despite high real interest rates owes much to the rapid
growth of the stock market and its increasingly  important role in
supplying equity capital to the corporate sector.
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- is pan of a larger cf'fort in PRE to understand the role of capital markets in the growth and adjustment
process of developing countrics.  Copies of this paper are available frec from the Wurld Bank, 1818 H
Strect NW, Washington DC 20433. Pleasc contact Maria Raggambi, rrm  N9-041, extension 37657 (47
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Dailamni's  econometric findings support three  evident in the 1980s, when rapid growth of the
conclusions about the relationship between cor-  market has becn accompanied by vigorous
porate finance and real investmenE  in Korea:  economic growth and a boom in corporate
business investment.
First, assuming that debt capital has been
subsidized through both taxation and regulatory  Third, corporations in Korea have used low-
intercst ratc policy, corporations have drawn on  cost debt to finance investments in financial
the stock market to finance their marginal  assets as well as in physical and productive
investment projects.  assets. These financial assets - liquid assets
(cash, bank deposits, and govemment securi-
This reliance on new share issues as the  ties), other companies' shares, and accounts
marginal source of financial capital is consistent  receivable --  are known to account for relatively'
with the observed relationship between stock  more (42 6 pcrccnt) of total corporate assets in
market price movements and corporate invest-  Korea than in the United States (24.3 percent) or
inent behavior.  It also explains Daiiami's  the United Kingdom (37.8 percent).
inability to establish a statistically meaningful
relationship bctwccn corporate investments and  To the extent that extemal equity is the
profits - which would have been thc case had  corporate sector's marginal source ol' funds,
corporations funded their investments at thc  what is relevant in determining incentives for
margin through retained earnings.  new investmcnt is what determines the cost of
equity  (such  as taxation  of dividcnds  and capital
The marginal profitability of investment in  gains) plus the procedure for pricing new share
Korca is higi,  or has been shifting upward.  issues.
Otherwise it would be ditlicult to justify corpo-
rate reliance on relatively costly extemal equity  Policy should cater increasingly to the
as a marginal sourcc of funds.  requirement of developing equity markets,
including measures to change the mcthod of'
Second, the real aggregate stock market  pricing new share issues from the prevailing par-
price, rather than the average q, or even the  value based system (or premiums thercol) to a
average rate of profit, is the preferred proxy for  system based on market forces.  The existing
the theoretically appropriate - but unobserved  par-value pricing procedure has evident!y becn
marginal q in explaining corporatc invest-  an important factor behind the high cost of
ment behavior. The link between stock market  external equity capital in Korea and a potential
and real cconomic activity' has been particularly  source of speculation.
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tance.I.  Tntr6dua  tion
Central  to  the  effectiveness  of financial  policiea  geared  towards  promot-
ing  real  business  investment  is  the  interaction  between  corporations'  financ-
ing  and  irvestment  decisions. The  analysis  of this  interaction  and its
implications  for  the  role  of finance  in  real  economy  has  long  been  debated  in
the  field  of both  corporate  finance  and investment  theory.' In  the  former,
the  debate  has  centered  on the  determinants  of optimal  capital  structure  in
the  capital  market  environment  of industrialized  countries  where  the  existence
of  well  developed  securities  markets  for  pricing  of various  debt  and  equity
claims  on corporate  assets  are taken  for  granted. Within  this  context,  one
important  goal  of research  has  been  to  modify  the  implications  of the  original
Modigliani-Miller  (1958)  leverage  irrelevance  theorem,  by taking  explicit
account  of the  influences  of taxes  and  costs  of  bankruptcy  (Kraus  and  Litzen-
berger  (1973),  Scott  (1976),  Kim (1978)],  the  agency  cost  of debt  (Jensen and
Meckling  (1976)]  and  the  potential  loss  of non-debt  tax  shields,  such  as
depreciation  allowances,  (De  Angelo  and  Masulis  (1980)]  on the  determination
of optimal  financial  leverage. 2 These  studies  have  generally  treated  the  cor-
porate  real  investment  decisions  as exogenous  and  have focused  on the  financ-
ing  aspects  of corporate  investment  behavior. In contrast,  there  is the
important  strand  of research  on the  neoclassical  theory  of private  investment
behavior  which,  either  in  its  original  context  [Jorgenson  (1963),  Jorgenson
and  Hall (1971)]  or in its  modified  cost  of adjustment  context  [Lucas  (1967),
I  See,  for  example,  Vickers  (1970),  Khu  and  Meyer (1963),  Coen (1971),  Dhrymes
and  Kurz (1967),  and  Ciccolo  and  Fromm  (1979,  1980).
2  For  recent  empirical  evidence  on the  simultaneous  influence  of these  attrib-
utes  on optimal  corporate  capital  structure  in  the  U.S.,  see  Bradley,  Jarrell
and  Kim (1984);  Titman  and  Wessels  (1988).- 3 -
Gould  (1968),  Treadway  (1969),  Hayashi  (1982)],  assumes  perfect  capital  mar-
kets  and  no uncertainty.3  In this  case,  it follows  that  the  firm's  real
investment  policy  is  independent  of  how it is  financed.
An important  point  of  co-  ergence  between  these  separate  areas  of
research  activity  on the  theory  of investment  and  finance  is  the  recent
advances  in the  theory  of imperfect  capital  markets  associated  with,  among
others,  Greenwald,  Stiglitz  and  Weiss  (1984),  Myers  and  Majluf  (1984),  Ber-
nanke  and  Gertler  (1989),  Fazzari,  Hubbard  ard  Petersen  (1988);  Grossman  and
Hart (1982). In  an important  departure  from  the  traditional  perfect  capital
market/full  information  assumptions  underlying  the  Modigliani-Miller  (1958)
theorem--or  the  Jorgenson  Investment  model  (1963)--this  ncw  strand  of litera-
ture  emphasizes  the  imperfections  in  capital  markets  arising  not  only  from
taxes,  but also  from  asymmetry  of information  between  users  and  suppliers  of
finance,  and  shows  how  these  imperfections  may  create  sndogenous  financing
constraints  preventing  firms  from  investing  in  projects  with  positive  net
present  values. This  possibility  arises  because  of the  additional  premium
imposed  on the  supply  of external  finance,  both debt  and  equity,  when inves-
tors  are  less  informed  about  the  firm's  investment  opportunities  or its  asset
characteristics  than  insiders,  i.e.  managers  or stockholders.  As a
consequence,  the  firm  cannot  costlessly  substitute  external  for  internal  funds
in  order  to finance  its  desired  levels  of investment  or dividend  payments.
The  upshot  is that  firms'  financing,  dividend  and  investment  decisions  are
inzerdependent,  and the  nature  of this  interdependence  is  influenced  by the
institutional  and  structural  features  of underlying  capital  market  environ-
ment.
3  For  an extension  of the  neoclassical  theory  of investment  to include  uncer-
tainty,  see  Lucas  and  Prescott  (1971),  Hartman  (1972);  Pindyck  (1982);  and
Abel (1983)..4-
Considering  Liperfections  in capital  markets,  the  experience  of develop-
ing  countries  presents  a germane  ground. In almost  all these  countrles  capl-
tal  markets  are  characterized  by a  high  degree  of segmentation,  severe
informational  asymmetry,  incomplete  markets,  weak  prudential  supervision,  and
above  all  by pervasive  governront  interventions  in  the  form  of direct  alloca-
tion  of credit,  official  setting  of interest  rates  and  tlght  regulatory
restrictions  on companies'  pricing  and  offerings  of new  equity  share  issues.4
These  imperfections  are,  to a large  extent,  structural,  ln the  sense  that  they
lmpose  a  hlgher  degree  of stringency  on firas'  financlng  and  investment  ceci-
sions  than  are  Liplied  by pure informational  asymetry presumed  to exist  ln
developed  countries'  capital  markets. The  reform  of these  structural
imperfections  is  currently  the  focus  of liberalizatlon  measures  advocated  by
the  international  financial  organizations  [see,  Cho  (1986),  Gelb  and  Honohan
(1988),  World  Bank  (1989)].
The  objectives  of this  paper  are  two-fold: flrst,  to develop  an inte-
grated  approacn  towards  the  problem  of  optima)  corporate  real  investment  and
finance  in the  context  of a financial  model  oE  a developing  economy
characterized  by credit  rationing,  a controlled  banking  sector,  and  an orga-
nized  equity  market;  and  second,  to  apply  the  model  to the  non-financial  cor-
porate  sector  of the  Korean  economy. Korea  presents  an interesting  example
for  a  number  of reasons,  including  the  government's  traditionally  active  use
of credit,  interest  rate  and  tax  policy  to stimulate  investment;  the  existence
of  relatively  well-developed  and  broad  based  equity  markets;  and  the  large
size  of the  corporate  sector,  accounting  for  about  60  percent  of total  domes-
tic  capital  formation  (see  Data  Annex  for  background  information  on these
features  of the  Korean  economy]. In addltion,  the  tax  treatment  of income
from  capital  in  Korea,  particularly  at the  personal  level,  is  very different
4 See,  for  example,  Gelb (1989);  Tybout  (1984);  Nabi (1989);  Kim (1989¼,  and
the  World  Bank  (1989).- 5-
from  that  in  the  United  States, 5 thereby  providing  an opportunity  to  analyze
the  relationshil  bet ien  capital  taxation,  corporate  finance  and investment,
issues  whic;h  have so far  been explored  only  in the  context  of industrialized
countries  with  mature  securities  markets Miller  (1977),  Poterba  and  Summers
(1983,  1985);  Bradley,  Jarrell  and  Kim (1984)].
The  remainder  of the  paper  is  organized  as  follows. In Section  I  we
describe  our  theoretical  model  of companies'  optimal  investment  and financing
behavior,  which  is  based  on the  familiar  'Tobin's  Q"  approach  to the  theory  of
investment,  but  extended  to incorporate  some  important  tax  and financial  fea-
tures  of  Korean  economy. Specifically,  in  the  model,  there  are three  sources
of funds: (i)  retained  earnings;  (ii)  debt  capital;  and (iii,  external
equity. Firms  raise  external  equity  in  the  form  of  both initial  public  offer-
ings  (IPO's)4  and  seasoned  issues  of stocks,  while  debt  is  placed  only  with
the  financial  institutions  including  both domestic  and  foreign  banks  and
non-bank  financial  institutions.  There  exists  a  well-functioning  trading  mar-
ket in  equity  shares  which  price  equity  claims  competitively,  but  the  interest
rate  on  bank loans  is  administratively  set  and is  treated  as a policy
variable. Capital  gains  are  exempt  from  personal  taxes,  but  dividend  incomes
5  While  there  are important  similarities  in  the  prevailing  tax  codes  in  Korea
and  the  United  States  in terms  of corporate  taxation,  there  are important
differences  in  personal  taxation. One  such  difference,  for  example,  is  the
much  lighter  taxation  of interest  income  relative  to equity  income  in  Korea
than  in the  United  States. Thanks  to  various  exemptions,  the  effective  maxi-
mum tax  rate  on interest  income  (including  defense,  education  and  residence
taxes)  in  Korea  is 18  percent  compared  to 28  percent  in the  United  States
(after  the  tax  reform  of 1986).  But income  from  stocks  is  taxed  much  more
heavily  in  Korea;  although  capital  gains  are  not  subject  to  personal  taxation
there,  dividend  income  is  taxed  at a rate  as high  as 70  percent  for  wealthy
individuals,  once  the  defense  and  residence  taxes  are  taken  into  account. See
data  Annex,  Table  A.1  for  details.
6  The  amount  of capital  raised  through  IPO's  depends  of course  on the  number
of companies  going  public,  and  this  has  varied  considerably  during  the  past
two  decades. In 1987,  for  instance,  there  were  35  new listings  and  one  delis-
ting.  See  Socuriti..  Market  in  Korea,  the  Korea  Securities  Dealers  Associ-
ation,  1988,  for  details.*6-
are  sUkjO-  to  high  marginal  porsonal  tax  rates.  Given  these  tax  and  finan-
cial  constraints,  the  firm's  optimal  rate  of  real  investment  Ls  derived  as  a
function  of wTobin's  marginal  Q," (the  ratio  between  the  market's  valuation  of
an incremental  unit  of capital  to its  c;at  of replacement),  tax,  and  financial
parameters  characterizing  the  fLrm's  marglnal  source  of  funds.
Section  III  discusses  the  estimation  of  the  model,  wlth  annual  data  from
1963  to  1986.  UsLng  both  capital  market  and  balance  sheet  data,  several
measures  of the  valuatlon  ratio  are  provided  and  their  relovance  and  limXta-
tion  for  explaining  corporate  real  investment  behavior  in the  Korean  economy
are  discussed. Finally,  Section  IV  concludes  the  paper  with  a brief
discussion  of some  relevant  policy  implications  and  lessons.
II.  Theorptieal FrAmovprk
1.  The  Modal
We begin  our  analysis  with a  description  of the  objectives  that  a firm's
managers  may  pursue  in formulating  their  investment  and  financing  plans  in the
tax  and financial  environment  of  Korean  economy.
Given  the  family-based  structure  of corporate  ownership  and  control  in
Korea,  it  seems  plausible  to  assume  that  managers  act  in the  interest  of
existing  shareholders  ano  seek  to  maximize  the  value  of equity  subject  to  a
set  of constraints. 7 These  ccnstraints  are  set  by technolo&  by imperfec-
tions  in capital  markets,  by tax  provisions,  and  by 4nvestors'  required  return
on equity. The  returns  required  by equity  holders  depend  on  returns  on
alternative  investment  opportunities,  which  in  Korea  (where  capital  markets
have  until  quite  recently  been  virtually  closed),  are  taken  to  be yields  on
governmerst  bonds.
7 This  assumption  also  applies  to corporations  with  diffused  shareholding
bases  under  the  conditions  that  managers  have  a share  ownership  stake  in the
firm  [Jensen  and  Heckling  (1976),  or  when  the  firm  is leveraged  with  potential
threat  of  bankruptcy  (see  Grossman  and  Hart (1982)].We,  thus,  posit,  p-(I-  )R,  where  p  - required  return  oii  equity;  R -
average  yield  on government  bonds,  and  xi  - effective  persona,  tax  rate  on
interest  on government  bonds. Similarly,  letting  a  to  be marginal  personal
tax  rate  on dividend  income,  and  noting  that  capital  gains  in  Korea  are  exempt
from  personal  taxation,  the  firm's  objective  can  be stated  formally  as:
maxE.-f  exp  (-p1)  [(1-m)d(t)-u(t)]  dt  (I)
where  d(t)  and  v(t)  denote,  respectively,  the  firm's  dividend  payment  and  new
share  issues  at  time  t,  and  E.  is  the  present  value  of  future  stream  of after
tax  dividen'  payments  net  of  new  stock  issues.
The firm  solves  the  maximization  problem  (1),  subject  to  a  set  of  con-
straints.  The  first  constraint  stems  from  the  legal  requirement  mandated  by
law  [The  Capital  Market  Promotior.  Act  of 19681,  which  obliges  companies  to
maintain  a  defined  minimum  stream  of  dividend  payments  regardless  of  their
cash  flow  or tax  consequences.'  Thus,  we have
d(t) > di  vtjme  2
whete  d is  an  exogenously  given  stream  of  dividend  payments.
Likewise,  we constrain  new share  issues  to  be non-negative  or:
u(t)  2 0  Vtimn  (3)
8  Note that  such  tax  consequences  are  very severe  in  Korea  where  capital  gains
are  not  subject  to  personal  taxation,  while  dividend  income  is taxed  at a
relatively  high rate.  In  spite  of that,  companies  have  distributed  a sizeable
portion  of their  earnings  as dividends  to shareholders,  averaging  28  pe cent
for  the  corporate  sector  as  a  whole  over  the  1975-1986  period. The tax  cost
associated  with this  pay-out  ratio,  computed  at an average  dividend  income  tax
rate  of 58  percent,  amounts  to 16.2  percent  of corporate  earnings  or about  3.4
percent  of corporate  fixed  investment.a8-
While  there  is  no legal  restriction  on companies  repurchasing  their  shares,
the  strong  need  for  funds  induced  by robust  expans.on  of corporate  investment
effectively  precludes  this  option.
The third  constraint  refers  to the  firm's  access  to the  official  credit
market,  which  is  assumed  to  be limited. Specifically,  we assume  that  banks
are  willing  to lend  only  a fraction  of each  enterprise's  new  investment  needs.
This  fraction  is  assumed  to  depend  negatively  on the  company  dAbt/capital
ratio. A linear  version  of this  restriction  is  expressed  as,
b(t)  S  hP(t)  l(t)  +  I  P(t)  K(t)  - I,  8(t)  (4)
where  b(t) is the  maximum  lezel  of  bank  credit  extended  at time  t,  B(t) is  the
stock  of  corporate  debt  outstanding,  K(t) is  the  stock  of real  capital,  I(t)
is  gross  corporate  real  iiavesLment,  P(t)  in  the  price  of capital  goods,  and  h,
P  and  P2 are  non-negative  parameters  of the  underlying  supply  function  of
bank  credit,
The fourth  constraint  refers  to the  equality  between  the  use  and  sources
of funds. The firm's  sources  of funds  consist  of three  items: (a)  after  tax
operating  profits;  net  of interest  paymkent  but including  depreciationl  allow-
ances;  (b)  net  borrowing;  and  (c)  net  proceeds  from  new  share  issues. On the
use  side,  there  are  two  main  items: (a)  payments  of dividends  and (b)
expenditures  on new  capital  goods  including  costs  of installation  and  adjust-
ment. Under  these  conditions,  cash  flow  available  for  distribution  to  exis-
ting  share  holders  at time  t  are  given  by
d(t)  - (I-Ti)  [it(K(t))  - r  B(t)]  +  b(t)  - B(L)  +  (I-u)  v(t)
- P(t)  C(I(t),  K(t))  - P(t)(  l-  rz(t))l(t)  (5)
where  n(.)  - before  interest  and tax  profit,  taken  to  be an increasing  and
concave  function  of K, i.e.  "  > 0  ,, 5  0,  r  - interest  rate,  p  - amortiza-
tion  rate  on debt,  v - new share  issues,  u  - the  average  cost,  consisting  of.9-
both transaction  and  underpricing  costs,  per  unit  of  capital  raised  through
external  equity  issues,  % - the  corporate  profit  tax  rate,  and  C  (.)  - an
adjustment-cost  function assumed  to  be an increasing  function  of  I  and  K and
z  - present  value  of depreciation  allowance  allowed  for  tax  purposes  on one
unit  of  new investment.'
The  cash  flow  constraint  (5)  is straightforward,  although  three  features
require  coomnt.  First,  it is  noted  that  interest  paymeats  are treated  as  tax
ceductible.  This  conforms  to  the  prevailing  tax  regulation  in  many  countries
including  Korea,  where  tax  allowances  are  made  for  corporate  interest  pay-
ments. This,  in  effect,  lowers  the  cost  of  borrowing  and  thus  induces  firms
to  substitute  debt for  equity  financing. The  limit  to this  process  of
substitution  is  determined  either  by some  legal  >%ad  institutional  restraints
on the  debt  finance  available,  or through  consideration  of varioas  leverage-
related  costs  such  as  bankruptcy  costs,  costs  due  to agency  and  asymmetrical
information  problems  or a loss  of non-debt  tax  shiel.ds  (see  De Angelo  and
Masulis  (1980);  Kim (1982);  Ross  (1985)]. Second,  it is  assumed  that  external
equity  financing  is  costly,  and  the  cost  is  proportional  to  the  gross  proceeds
from  new  share  issuance,  i.e.  uu(1).10  Thus,  the  net  proceeds  from  external
equity  capital  are  equal  to (l-u)v,  which  is included  in  equation  (5)  as an
addition  to the  firm's  cash  flows. Third,  we have included  a cost  of adjust-
ment  item,  C(I,  K) in  equation  (5)  to  capture  the  additional  installation
9  Note that  equation  (5)  excludes  a term  for  depreciation  allowances  allowed
for  tax  purposes  on the  existing  level  of capital. This  term  depends  on  past
investment  end  has  no influence  on future  investment  [see  Abel (1983);  Summers
(1981)  for  details.]
10  We recognize  two  types  of costs  here:  (i)  transaction  costs  involving
underwriters'  commissions  and  legal  and  other  related  expenses;  and  (ii)  the
indirect  costs  associated  with the  underpricing  of  new share  issues  due  pri-
marily  to  the  "par  value"  method  of setting  the  offer  pr4-e  at the  par  value.
These  indirect  costs  are  very serious  in  Korea,  where  ii .ial  public  offerings
(IPOs)  are  traditionally  priced  at,  or very  close  to,  par  value.  IPO's  how-
ever,  account  for  only  a small  proportion  of total  equity  capital  raised
externally;  the  dominant  share  comes  from  seasoned  issuance  if stocks  offered
to the  existing  shareholders  in the  form  of rights  issues.10  -
expenses  associated  with the  process  of investment.  The  rationale  is  based  on
the  models  of  Lucas  (1967),  Go.ild  (1968)  and  Treadway  (1969),  where  the  cost
of adjustment  was  introduced  in  the  neoclassical  theory  of investment  to
obtain  an explicit  solution  for  the  firm's  optimal  rate  of investment.  Fur-
thermore,  this  cost  function  is  assumed  to  depend  positively  on  Land  specifi-
cally  to  take  the  form:
C  (1,K)  - a/2  (K  -n-.))  x  (6)
where  a  a  0  is  a  constant  parameter,  and  n(.)  is  a  function  to  be  specified
later  and denotes  the  normal  or  long-term  growth  of  fixed  assets.
Two other  constrai-ts  %re  the  evolution  of  the  firm's  stocks  of  capital
and  debt  as given  by:
JKt)  - I(t)  - 6  K(t)  (7)
B(t)  - b(t)  - 3  B(t)  (8)
where  6  is  the  rate  of depeeciation  of physical  capital.
Equation (7)  describes  the  familiar  perpetual  method  of  capital  accumu-
lation,  wherein  real  capital  increases  at the  rate  of gross  investment  less
depreciation  due to  obsolescence  and  wear  and  tear. The  rate  of  depreciation
is  further  taken  as a constant  fraction  of existing  capital  stock. In equa-
tion (8)  net flow  of loans  from  the  banking  sector  is  defined  as the  diffe*-
ence  between  new  loans  contracted  and  the  amortization  payment  on the  existing
loans  where  the  rate  of amortization  is  assumed  to  remain  unchanged  over  time.- 11  -
The  maximization  problem  facing  the  firm,  stated  formally,  is to choose
b(t),  I(t),  and  v(t)  to  maximize  the  present  value  of its  market  equity,  given
by equation  (1),  subject  to the  constraints  (2),  (3),  (4),  (5),  (7)  and (8)
and  given  initial  conditions,  t(o)  and  K(o).  This  problem  can  be solved  by
means  of standard  control  techniques.  Thus,  we treat  b(t),  I(t)  and  v(t)  as
control  variables  and  B(t)  and  K(t)  as state  variables  and  formulate  the
current-value  Hamiltonian,  H, as,
H  - (1-m)  d-v  +  k  (I  - 6K)  +  p  (b  - 3B)  (9)
where  k  and  p are  the  associated  shadow  prices  of capital  and  debt,  respec-
tively.
Taking  into  account  tae  constraints  (2),  (3)  and (4)  and  substituting  for
d  from  equation  (5)  into  (9),  we define  the  Lagrangian  L  as:
L  - (1-m.+lW 2)  [(I  -t)  (n(K)-rB)  - tB +  b-P(1(1-tz)+C(1,K))]
•  ((1-m.+i 2) (1-U)  +  I3-)  V
•  ip,(hPI  +  1, PK  -328  - b)  (10)
where w,,  V2 and i3  are the Lagrangian multipliers associated with constraints
(4),  (2)  and  (3)  respeccively.  The  necessary  conditions  for  an optimal  solu-
tion  are  the  following:
_  (p  +  6)  X  - (1-m+e 2 ))  [(I  -T) an  P  aK]-  wi'  (1l  a)
1i  (p  +  1)  p  +  (1-m+, 2 )  CD +  (1-t)r]  +  12W 1 (11.b)
aL
ab  (1-m.i4p 2)  +  p  - VI  0  (I  1.c)
-L  (1  -m*V 2 P  1  --rZ  *  C)  +  . *  -lp  0  (11.d)- 12  -
d'  (L  -m.+)(-u)  +  3  1  O  (I  1)
,  (10  .1)
Va  (d-d)  - 0  (11.g)
V3U  (ll.h)
There  are,  A 2riorl,  several  possible  optimll  paths  or regimes  corre-
sponding  to  whether  constraints  (2),  (3),  and (4)  are  binding  or  not.  To
determine  these  optimal  paths,  we rely  on the  assumption  that  debt  is cheaper
than  equity  financing  in  Korea,  which  would  imply  that  firms  have  the  incen-
tive  to  resort  to the  maximun  level  of  borrowing  possible. In this  case,
VI  >  0  and  from  equations  (ll.b)  and (ll.c)  it follows  that  ,  _
which  is the  capitalized  difference  in  the  after  tax  cost  of debt  and  equity
per  unit  of debt  capital,  or the  subsidy  to the  existing  shareholders  of the
firm's  having  access  to low  cost  debt. To derive  formally  the  firm's  optimal
investment  rule  and  its  financing,  we substitute  for  Wi  into  equations  (ll.d)
and  obtain,
(I-  m +  )[I@  a/C  - - z-h  p +  +  2]J  q  (12)
where  q  - is the  familiar  "Tobin's  marginal  Q" defined  as the  ratio  of the
marginal  value  of an additional  unit  of capital  (i.e.  the  shadow  price  of
capital),  x  to the  price  of  capital  goods,  P.  [Abel  (1979),  Chirinko  (1987)].
Equation  (12)  describes  the  equilibrium  condition  for  the  firm's  optimum
level  of real  investment.  It  states  that  an optimizing  firm  will continue  to
invest  until  the  marginal  cost  of an  additional  unit  of investment  is  equal  to
the  marginal  value  of that  investment.  The  marginal  cost  of investment
depends  on the  cost  of the  marginal  source  of funds  as well  as  on the  net- 13 -
marginal  costs  of acquiring  capital. The latter  terms  involve  the  sum  of
purchase  and  marginal  adjustment  costs  less  the  tax  savings  from  depreciation
allowances  on one  unit  of investment  in fixed  assets  and  less  the  leverage
related  benefits  to  the  existing  shareholders  of the  availability  of low  cost
debt.  The  availability  of low  cost  debt  implies  also  that  equity  is the
marginal  source  of financial  capital  to the  firm;  and  in this  respect  there
are two  alternative  optimal  investment  rules,  depending  on  whether  the  firm
finances  its  investment  at the  margin  by resorting  to  retained  earnings  (i.e.
internal  equity),  or  by issuing  new  shares,  (i.e.  external  equity). These
alternatives  correspond,  formally,  to  whether  (V2 - and  V3>O),  which  implies
!-  m  +  2 1 -m; or whether  (*2>0  and  Vs-0),  which  from  equation  (ll.  e) implies
that  1-m.+42-,',.  Substituting  these  alternative  values  for  1-m+W 2 in  equa-
tion  (12),  and  solving  it  for  the  firm's  optimal  investment  rate  yields:
1  r  I  1  tz  p  -1-t)rl
- a  [(1r  q  _  (1-  'z-CZ)j  +  h LP-(I-  J *n(.)  (13.a)
which  is  the  firm's  optimal  investment  rate  when  the  marginal  source  of  funds
is  retained  earnings,  and
I  -Ia  [(I-u)  q  - (1 -tz)]+  h  [  nF.]  (13_b)
which  is the  corresponding  investment  equation  when  the  firm  finances  its
investment  at the  margin  through  issuance  of  new  equity.14 -
2.  CnMarat&  Invaatm.nt  And MArginI  Sourte  of Funds
These  equations  offer  some  important  insights  into  the  relationship
between  the  firm's  optimal  investment  and  its  sources  of equity  financing.  To
highlight  this  relationship,  it is  convenient  to  abstract,  for  a moment,  from
the  influence  of debt  subsidy  and  solve  for  the  steady-state  values  of mar-
ginal  q to  obtain  q6
1-(I-m)(I-xz) and  qea-U=.  These  define,  respectively,
the  threshold  values  of q for  marginal  investment  projects  that  are  financed
by retained  earnings  and  by issuing  new  equity  shares. For  recent  values  of
m, c and  T2 from the  Korean  economy,  it  can  be shown  that  q2'  >1> q,'  which
implies  a hierarchical  order  in firms'  financing  behavior,  shown  in  Figure  1.
In this  figure  the  horizontal  lines  SI  and  S2  correspond  respectively  to q  -
q*1 and  q - q* 2, and the  relatively  large  distance  between  these  lines
reflects  the  combined  influences  of high  taxation  of  dividend  income  relative
to  capital  gains  and the  direct  and indirect  costs  of issuing  new  share  equity
in  Korea. This  high  cost  differential  between  internal  and  external  source  of
equity  finance  implies  that  only  firms  with  relatively  high  marginal  profit-
ability  of investment,  as shown  by demand  schedule  D2, resort  to  external
equity  as their  marginal  source  of funds. In  contrast,  firms  with  investment
projects  characterized  by demand  schedule  D1, rely  on internal  funds  to
finance  their  marginal  investments.  This  direct  relationship  between  firms'
investment  and  financing  decisions  provides  a useful  device  to motivate  the
discussion  of financial  policy. To the  extent  that  firms  finance  their  mar-
ginal  investment  projects  through  issuance  of new  equity  shares  rather  than
through  retentions  of earnings,  it is  the  stock  market  performance  that  bears
influence  on the  incentives  to invest. On the  other  hand,  for  firms  that
retention  of earnings  is  the  marginal  source  of funds,  one  expects  a close
relationship  between  corporate  earnings  and  investment. In  practice,  each  of
these  scenarios  may  apply  to some  firms,  but  which  one is  predominant  is the
key  empirical  question  to  be addressed  in  the  next  section. Given  that  our- 15 -
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Figure 1: Marginal Source of Funds
and Investment Schedules.16
data  relates  to the  corporate  sector  as  a  whole,  we take  a  weighted  average  of
equations  (13.a)  and (13.b)  with  the  weight  assigned  to the  former  denoted  by
e,  to  obtain  an aggregate  investment  equation:
1  r  I(1e  \1-u+  I-z  hp  (1n-¶)r14
l,l~  [(  I  +l8(-uq  ls  a I  P+0+0+ I
which  provides  the  basis  for  our  estimation.  Note that  the  numerical  value
that  e takes  is  critical  to the  identification  of the  marginal  sources  of
funds  to the  corporate  sector. A value  of  0  - 0 implies  that  new  share  issue
is  the  marginal  source  of funds;  a  value  of  e- 1,  on the  other  hand,  implies
that  the  corporate  sector  relies  on internally  generated  funds  to finance  its
marginal  investment  projects.- 17 -
III.  Empsircal  Reults
III1.  SRpecification  And Data
In this  section  we use  annual  data  for  the  non-financial  corporate  sector
of the  Korean  economy  over  the  period  of 1963-1986  to  estimate  simultaneously
the  system  of  equatiorts  (14)  and (4). The  starting  point  is the  modification
of these  equations  into  some  suitable  empirical  form.  First,  we specify
n(.),  the  long-tErm  growth  in  fixed  capital  in equation  (14),  as a function  of
the  long-term  growth  in final  demand,  and  distinguishing  between  domestic  and
external  demand  wo poeit:  n(.)  - n'X,,  where  i'-(rI.,  n1l,  n12, n,.  I14.  %,  I1) is  a
vector  of  parameters  and  X,'-(I,  xX,,  x,,,1,  x,U 2, x2,,  x2,, 1 , x21 ,2), where  xi,  and
x2,  are,  respectively,  growth  rates  of exports  and  domestic  demand  in  year  t.
Second,  we extend  equation  (4)  to  account  for  the  possibility  that  bank  credit
may  be used to finance  investments  other  than  those  in  fixed  assets. Thus,
denoting  corporate  investment  in  financial  assets  by At,  the  basic  equations
to  be estimated,  expressed  in  discrete  time,  are:
l_  ,I  [(  -q,+(e-O)(1  u,)q,)1  - T,Z,S)]  a  (2  X  (15Ea)
bK  _  + h  BIA  - ,2  p  I + 133  K  e2  (15.b) P,  K,  *P,K,  PK,
where  all  terms  in  equation  (15.b)  are  scaled  by PK to  conform  to  equation
(15.  a),  El  E 2, are  disturbance  terms  assumed  to  be normally  distributed  with
definite  variance  - co-variance  matrix  and  zero  means,  and.18
S,(,)pi  , P-(l-l)rl
where  a  is a  given  value  of the  rate  of  amortization  taken  to  be 10 percent
per  year.  Note  that,  for  a given  value  of  P2,  St  is  empirically  observable
and  thus  can  be used  as  part  of the  data  set.
To proceed  with estimation,  we first  obtain  an  unbiased  estimate  for  02
by applying  instrumental  variables  to  equation  (15.b),  using  total  corporate
earnings  as an instrument  for  investment,  I.  This  procedure  is  needed  to
overcome  the  simultaneity  problem  associated  with the  appearance  of investment
as  an Lndependent  variable  in  equation  (15.b). Thus,  using  annual  data from
1964  to 1986,  the  instrumental  variable  estimate  of  A 2 is  given  by  02  - 0.20
with  standard  error  - 0.055  and t - statistic  - 3.71. Given  this  estimate  of
02,  we next  turn  to  the  estimation  of equations  (15.a)  and (15.b). One
obstacle,  however,  remains. As emphasized  originally  by Tobin  and  Brainard
(1977),  and  subsequently  by Summers  (1981),  Hayashi  (1982),  and  Chirinko
(1987);  q ln  equation  (15.a)  is  not  directly  observable  and  so this  equation
is  not  empirically  operational.  The standard  approach  adopted  in the  empiri-
cal  work in the  United  States  has  been to  use  "average  q" defined  as the  ratio
of the  market  valuation  of existing  capital  to its  replacement  cost (see,  for
instance,  von  Furstenberg  (1977);  Summers  (1981)]. The  use  of average  q is
appealing  from  a theoretical  point  of view,  since  it  provides  a link  between
securities  markets  performance  and  corporate  real  investment  behavior. The
problem  resides,  however,  with the  empirical  performance  of average  q in
explaining  corporate  investment.  The  experience  in  the  United  States  reveals
that  measures  of average  q are  typically  very  poor  predictors  of investment,
and  are  statistically  inferior  to  other  proxies  such  as the  real  aggregate
stock  market  price  index  [Barro  (1989)]. Interestingly,  our  findings  with
Korean  data  confirmed  these  findings  in the  United  States. Experimenting  with- 19  -
several  measures  of average  q11, we were  not  able  to  establish  any  statis-
tically  meaningful  relationship  between  corporate  investment  and  average  q.
Instead,  the  use  of real  aggregate  stock  market  price  index  proved  to  be much
superior,  and  this  provides  the  basis  for  estimation  results  reported  below.
III.  2.  atA  n  Mathnd and  R-eulta
The  system  of investment  equation  (15.a)  and  the  bank  credit  supply  func-
tion (15.b)  were  estimated  simultaneously  by full  information  maximum  likeli-
hood  method,  with annual  data  from  1964-1986.  The  data  has  already  been
defined,  with  details  regarding  methodology,  sources  and  construction  being
reported  in  the  Data  Appendix.
Table  1 contains  the  estimation  results  under  two  specifications  of
parameter  a,  i.e  .; (i)  when  G was  not  g Rriori  restricted;  and (ii)  when  e  was
restricted  to  be zero. The  table  also  shows  the  log  likelihood  values  under
these  two  specifications  and  the  implied  likelihood  ratio  statistic  for  test-
ing  the  hypothesis  e-  0.  This  statistic  is  distributed  X2( 1),  with  critical
values  3.84  (5%  probability  of type  I  error)  and  6.63 (1%). Since  these
values  exceed  the  computed  likelihood  ratio  statistic  of 1.902,  we accept  the
specification  0-  0.  This is  an important  finding,  since  it  means  that  the
corporate  sector  in  Korea  finances  its  investment  at the  margin  by issuing  new
equity  shares,  rather  than  by resorting  to  earning  retention. This reliance
on external  equity  as the  marginal  source  of funds  for  financing  investment  is
consistent  with the  observation  that  investment  in  Korea  is  related  to  stock
market  price  index  but  not to  corporate  earnings. The  lack  of strong  rela-
tionship  between  investment  and  earnings  implies  that  investment  has  not  been
constrained  by internal  corporate  resources.
11  These  measures  were  based  on the  ratio  of market  value  of equity  plus  book
value  of debt  to the  replacement  cost  of  capital,  where  capital  was  defined
either  broadly  to include  machinery,  equipment,  and  inventories,  or narrowly
as only  the  sum  of machinery  and  equipment.20
Given  the  weight  of evidence  in support  of the  specification,  e-  0,  we
continue  our  interpretation  of the  results  under  this  specification,  as  con-
tained  in  the  second  column  of  Table  1.  Regarding  these  results,  they  seem
quite  satisfactory,  since  all  have  the  right  sign  and  all,  with  the  exception
of second  lags  of growth  of exports  and  domestic  demand,  are significantly
different  from  zero  at the  5 or 10  percent  levels,  as  marked  in the  table.
The  estimated  value  for  h is  0.43,  indicating  that  corporations  in  Korea  use
about  half  of their  low-cost  bank  loans  to finance  fixed  investments,  and  use
the  rest  to finance  others  such  as financial  investments.  This estimate  is
consistent  with  supplementary  information  on the  observed  share  of fixed
assets  in  Korean  corporate  balance  sheet  and  its  policy  implications  will  be
elaborated  below. The  estimates  of other  financial  parameters,  i.e. 013,
and  E3  are  all  strongly  significant,  supporting  the  view that  financial  and
real  investment  decisions  are  interdependent  in  Korea. The implied  value  for
the  coefficient  of cost  of adjustment  is  a,2 - 22.4,  which  is  high,  but  not
unusual  in  the  empirical  literature  on the  Q-approach  to investment. 12 The
possibility,  nevertheless,  remains  that  our  estimate  may contain  an upward
bias  due  to  errors  in  variables,  or due  to a specification"3  problem  arising
from  our  use  of the  aggregate  real  stock  market  price  index  as a  proxy  for  the
12  Though  not  directly  comparable,  Thirinko  (1987)  reports  estimate  for  a
ranging  from  536.62  to 558.7,  when ;he  influence  of demand  is included,  and
ranging  from  183.7  to 209.6,  when demand  is  excluded  from  his  model  of corpo-
rate  investment  in the  United  States. Similarly,  estimates  reported  by Fot-
erba  and  Summers  (1983)  for  the  United  Kingdom  data  are  much  higher  than  our
estimate  for  the  Korean  data.
13  We also  experimented  with the  use  of average  rate  of profits  as a proxy  for
marginal  q, but  the  results  were  not  satisfactory  to  warrant  reporting.  vi-
dently,  no single  proxy  can  capture  fully  the  influence  on  -nvastment  of  mar-
ginal  q.  Hence,  attention  should  be given  to  consideration  of severa'.  proxies
and  indicators.  The  methodology  for  estimating  multiplo  indicators  in  linear
structural  models  is  well  developed  [see,  for  instance,  Joreskog  and  Gold-
berger  (1975),  Bentler  (1983),  Aigner,  et. (1984)  for  estimation  issues  and
Titman  and  Wessels  (1988),  for  an interesting  application  to corporate
finance]. The  extension  and  application  of this  methodology  to  non-linear
models  which  are  typical  features  of the  Q-approach  to investment  presents  a
promising  area  of future  research.21 -
theoretically  appropriate,  but  not  observable,  marginal  q.  Fina  ly,  our
results  confirm  the  sensLtivLty  of  business  corporate  investment  in  Korea  to
changes  in  demand  conditions,  both internal  and  external. As shown  in  Table
1, the  contemporaneous  and  lagged  coefficients  of growth  rates  of both  real
exports  and  domestic  demand  are  estimated  at  a high  level  of significance,  and
lags  of  higher  order  do  not  seem  to  matter. Therefore,  our findings  lend
further  support  to the  relevance  of accelerator  terms  in  Q-wodels  of invest-
ment  behavior.. 22 -
Table  1:  Maximum-Likelihood  Estimates  of the
Parameters  of Equations  (15.a)  and (15.b),
(Standard  Errors  are  in Parentheses)
Parameter  or  Unrestricted  Restricted  (0-0)
Statistic
no*^l  0.12  0.10
(0.01)  (0.01)
a ^^ 1 32.72  44.79
(7.31)  (12.80)
h *  0.56  0.43
(0.23.)  (0.24)
n  u0.02  0.05
(0.02)  (0.02)
**
q2 ^-  0.01  0.04
(0.03)  (0.02)
Th  -0.03  -0.03
(0.02)  (0.02)
Ti4 0.33  0.31
(0.07)  (0.07)
Tns  0.29  0.34
(0.06)  (0.06)
n16  0.08  0.07
(0.05)  (0.06)
13  *  0.05  0.07
(0.04)  (0.04)
13  0.76  0.74
(0.17)  (0.18)
e  -0.17  0.00
(0.09)
Log  L  114.865  113.914
a  1.902
Noe:  Sample  period  is 1964-1986;  Log  L represents  the  log  likelihood  statis-
tic;  a  is the  likelihood  ratio  test  statistic  under  e-  0  hypothesis;
*I significant  at the  5  percent  level.
*I significant  at the  10  percent  level.23
IV.  Cnne1uuien  Anil  Poling,  Impieattona
The econonometric  findings  presented  in  this  paper  support  three  conclu-
sions  regarding  the  relationship  between  corporate finance  and  real  invest-
ment  in  Korea.
First,  given  the  preomise that  debt  capital  has  been  subsidized  through
both  taxation  and  regulatory  interest  rate  policy,  corporations  have  drawn  on
the  stock  market  to  finance  their  marginal  investment  projects.  This  reliance
on  new  share  issues  as  the  marginal  source  of  financial  capital  is  consistent
with  the  observed  relationship  between  stock  market  price  movements  and  corpo-
rate  investment  behavior.  It  also  accords  with  our  inability  to  establish  a
statistically  meaningful  relationship  between  corporate  investment  and
profits,  which  would  have  been  the  case  had  corporations  funded  their  invest-
ment  at  the  margin  through  retained  earnings.  This  conclusion  also  suggests
that  the  marginal  profitability  of  investment  in  Korea  is  high,  or  has  been
shifting  upwards.  Without  that,  it  would  be  difficult  to  justify  corporate
reliance  on  relatively  costly  external  equity  as  their  marginal  source  of
funds.
Second,  the  real  aggregate  stock  market  price,  rather  than  the  average  q,
or  even  the  average  rate  of profit,  is the  preferred  proxy  for  the  theoreti-
cally  appropriate--but  unobserved--marginal  q  in  explaining  corporate  invest-
ment  behavior.  This  conclusion  is  important,  rot  only  because  it  supports  the
findings  of  Barro  (1989)  and  Fischer  and  Merton  (1984)  for  the  United  States,
but  also  because  it  draws  attention  to  the  important  link  between  stock  market
and  real  economic  activity  in  the  Korean  economy.  Such  a  link  has  been  par-
ticularly  evident  in  the  1980s  when  the  rapid  growth  of  the  market  has  been
accompanied  by a  boom  in  corporate  business  investment  as  well  as a  vigorous
economic  growth. The  1980s  have  also  seen  other  important  macroeconomic  and
policy  changes  in the  Korean  economy  ircluding  measures  to reduce  inflation,  a- 24 -
large  growth  in  household  savings  and  a  sharp  turn-around  in  the  country's
balance  of payment  position  from  deficit  to surplus  in  1986.1  These  develop-
ments  highlight  the  macro  dimension  of stock  market  performance  in  Korea,  and
in  that  respect,  the  relationship  between  stock  market  and  investment  is
likely  to  be an interactive  one. Thus,  our  approach  of treating  the  stock
market  as  exogenous  is likely  to  have  introduced  an  upward  simultaneity  blas
in  the  estimated  coefficient  a,  due to  the  simultanelty  between  s*ock  market
and  corporate  real  investment  performances,
Third,  our  findings  highlight  the  extent  to  which  corporations  in  Korea
have  used low  cost  debt to  flnance  investments  ln  financial  assets,  as opposed
o physical  and  productive  assets. These  financial  assets,  referring  to liq-
uid  assets  (cash,  bank  deposlts  and  government  securities),  other  ccapanies'
shares  and  accounts  receivables  are  known  to  account  for  a relatively  larger
share  of corporate  total  assets  in  Korea  than  those  in  the  United  States  or
the  United  Kingdom. Evldence  provided  by Dailami  (1989,  b) on asset  composi-
tion  of corporate  balance  sheets  in  Korea  and  in  a sample  of  developed  coun-
tries  shows,  for  instance,  that  financial  assets  accounted  in 1983,  in
aggregate,  for  about  42.6  percent  of total  assets  in  Korea  as  compared  with  a
correspondIng  ratio  of 24.3  percent  in the  United  States  and 37.8  percent  in
the  United  Kingdom.
These  conclusions,  taken  together,  yield  important  implications  for  the
conduct  of financial  policy  in  Korea. They  suggest  that  a narrow  focus  on
interest  rate  policy  is likely  to  be ineffective,  not  only  because  of the
important  weight  of financial  assets  in  corporate  balance  sheets,  but  also
because  of the  increasingly  important  role  that  the  stock  market  has  played  to
14  See  Dailami  (1989  a);  Dornbusch  and  Park  (1987);  Corbo  and  Nam (1986)  for
review  and  analysis  of  macro  economic  evaluation  of Korean  economy  in the
1980s.25  -
supply  equity  capital  to the  corporate  sector  Is  To the  extent  that  external
equity  constitutes  the  marginal  source  of funds  to the  corporate  sector,  it is
the  consideration  of the  determinant  of  cost  of equity  such  as taxation  of
dividends  and  capital  g&ins,  as well  as the  procedure  for  pricing  new  share
issues,  which  are  relevant  in  determining  incentives  for  new  investment.16  In
this  regard,  policy  necds  to  cater  increasingly  to the  requirement  of  develop-
ment  of equity  markets,  including  measures  to  modify  the  prevailing  method  of
pricing  of new  share  issues  at par  rather  than  at  market  value. The  existing
par-value  pri'-ing  procedure  has  evidently  been  an important  factor  behind  the
high  cost  of external  equity  capital  in  Korea  and  a source  of unhelthy  specu-
latior..
15 For  the  corporate  sector  as a  whole,  equity  financing  accounted  during  the
period  1985-1987  for  23.7  percent  of total  corporate  external  financing  needs,
as compared  to 34.4  percent  from  traditional  bank loans.
16  There  is also  the  argument  against  subsidizing  debt  capital  that  lends  to
distortions  in resource  allocation.- 26 -
Da  La  AppendiA
The  primary  source  for  most  of the  data  used  in this  study  is the  Eco_-
nonIi  *atiaties YaArbook (ESYB),  Bank  of Korse,  various  issues.  Two set  of
flow  of funds  tables,  i.e.  the  Integrated  Accounts  of National  Income  and
Financial  Transactions,  and  Financial  Assets  and  Liabilities,  contained  in
this  publication  were  utilized  to  generat.  the  necessary  balance  sheet  data
for  the  total  non-financial  corporate  sector  for  the  years  1963.1986. These
data  were  supplemented,  when  necesryaq,  by drawing  on several  other  sources,
including  National  Accounts  (NA),  Bank  of  Korea;  KoreAn_Tax&i±Qn  (KT),  Minis-
try of Finance; SanuritAeu S  tatnea  Ymarhook  (SSYB),  Korea Stock Exchange;
and  Securities  Market  in  Korea (SMK),  various  years,  The  Korea  Securities
Dealers  Association.
The  definitions  of  variables  are  as follows:
1.  I  - gross  real  investment  in  machinery,  equipment,  structures,  and  inven-
tories,  for  non-residential,  non-financial  corporate  sector  at 1980  con-
stant  prices,  based  on (NA);
2.  q  - ratio  of aggregate  stock  market  price  Index  (Korea  Composite  Stock
Price  Index)  to implicit  price  deflator  for  capital  goods  (SSYB)  and
(NA);
3.  b - gross  borrowing  consisting  of special  and  commercial  bank loans,
insurance  and  trust  loans  and  net  foreign  loans,  (ESYB);
4.  B  - total  corporate  debt  consisting  of total  bank  debt,  foreign  debt  and
debt  owned  to insurance  and  trust  companies,  (ESYB);
5.  m - personal  tax  rate  on dividend  income,  constructed  as the  weighted
average  of  marginal  personal  tax  rates  on dividends  for  different  class- 27 -
of stock  holders,  i.e.  individuals,  institutions,  and  companies. The
source  of data  is (KT)  for  tax  rates  and  (SSYB)  for  stock  ownership  com-
position;
6.  p  - average  yield  on government  bonds;  for  the  1972-186 period  and  prior
to that  corporate  dividend  yield,  (SSYB);
7.  r  - nominal  lending  rate,  constructed  as the  simple  average  of rates  on
general  bank  loans,  export  loans,  loans  from  the  Machinery  Industry  Pro-
motion  rund;  and  loans  from  the  National  Investment  Fund,  (NA);
8.  c  - corporate  income  tax  rate.  including  defense  and  residence  tax, (KT);
9.  z  - present  value  of standard  depreciation  allowances  on new investment
in  fixed  assets  (machinery  and  equipment  and  structures)  allowed  for  tax
purposes  and  calculated  under  a straight-line  depreciation  formula  and
based  on  an asset  lifetime  of 42.5  years  for  structures  and 10  years  for
machinery  and  equipment,  (KT).
10. u - average  cost  per  unit  of gross  proceeds  from  issuing  new  equity
shares,  calculated  as:  u - (UPC  +  tc)  (RIPOS)  +  (1-RIPOS)  (tc),
where  UPC  - underpricing  cost  associated  with IPOS,  taken  from  Kim  and
Lee (1989);  tc  - transaction  cost,  taken  from  (SMK);  RIPOS  - ratio  of
capital  raised  through  IPOS  relative  to  total  capital  raised  by issuance
of new  equity  shares,  (SMK).
11. K - net  capital  stock,  where  capital  is  defined  broadly  to include
machinery  and  equipment,  structures  and inventories;  fixed  assets  were
calculated  at  replacement  cost  value,  based  on perpetual  inventory  value,
using  an average  depreciation  rate  of  0.091;  and  bench  mark  value  for
1962  obtained  from  Pyo (1988). Inventories  were  measured  at  market
value,  after  adjustments  for  inflation  and  inventory  turnover  are  taken
into  account  (NA)  and (ESYB).
12. A - corporate  investment  in  non-fixed  assets,  (ESYB).
13. x  - Annual  growth  rate  of export  volume  (NA).- 28 -
14. x2 - Annual  growth  rate  of real  domestic  demand  (NA).- 29 -
Tnvastment,  Financial  and  Tax  DAtas Korean  Non-financial  Corporate  Sector
(Annual  Average. for Selected Periods)
(Percentage,  unless indicated)
1963-69  70-74  75-78  79-81  82-86
1.  Cor:prta-  Fixed  Invent-
an
a. growth  rate  25.7  10.5  21.3  -1.1  11.7
b. percent of GDP  12.6  14.5  17.4  19.0  19.0
2.  Iaon  of  TWCz,=
fro  Ca2ta
a. corporate income  29.4  26.7  35.4  41.1  40.5
b. dividend income  11.3  15.8  57.i  61.6  57.6
c. income earned on
interest on bank
deposits  13.5  19.0  6.3  10.2  17.8
d. income earned on
interest from govern-
ment bonds  0  0  0  4.3  17.8
3.  ReaI Tnterent  Rate  -0.2  -5.8  -7.7  -3.5  6.4
4. Stock Market
a. Market Capitalization/
GDP  2.7  5.5  11.1  7.1  8.4
b. Real Aggregate Price
Index(1980-100)  166.8  230.0  216.5  117.4  121.8
5.  Corporate Investment/
Total Domestic  Investment  65.1  62.3  65.4  62.4  60.3
Noce and Sources:  See previous section on definition and source of data.*  30 -
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